EU-supported) western approach to statecraft, showing how its major successes come with serious strategic rigidities. We then contrast that approach with Russia's historical experience, which helps makes sense of Moscow's concern for the continuous advancement of western alliances and institutions into what used to be Russia's territory and sphere of influence. In the third section, we establish just how deeply rooted these clashing interest definitions are by examining how they played out at the end of the Cold War and the early post-Cold War years. This fateful series of events set in motion the forces and perceptions that continue to haunt the relationship. It follows that any new negotiated improvement of the relationship must entail some compromise in each side's basic approach to pursuing its interests. That is why it is so hard. Whether the game is worth the candle given all the trade-offs involved cannot be resolved in the confines of this paper, but it is clear that the stakes are rising with each passing month.
THE US-LED WEST: INSTITUTIONALIZED REALPOLITIK
The hallmark of the US and western European grand strategic culture is the pursuit of national interests via multilateral institutions based on ostensibly liberal principles. A bedrock of western foreign policy for over seven decades, this approach fuses principle with raw power politics, sincere commitment to liberal ideals with rank hypocrisy. Four core postulates stand out: First, US leadership is a necessary condition of institutionalized cooperation to address classical and new security challenges in Europe and its neighborhoods, which is, in turn, a necessary condition of the west's security.
Second, the maintenance of US security commitments to partners and allies in Europe (as well as in Asia) is a necessary condition of US leadership. Without these commitments, US leverage for leadership declines. America's partners in Europe tacitly or explicitly accept a subordinate role in a hierarchy in which they exchange deference on key strategic questions for US security provision. That bargain lies at the core of the west as a security community -specifically at the core of NATO.
Third, embedding US leadership in formal institutions often has major benefits for Washington and its partners: the classical functional benefits identified in institutionalist theory-focal point, reduced transaction costs, monitoring, etc.-as well as political and legitimacy benefits, which mitigate the awkward aspects of US dominance.
Fourth, the foundational western institutions reflect agreed upon and transparent rules that ostensibly bind all members-but the US is the least constrained. The unwritten clause in the hierarchical bargain at the heart of the US-led liberal order is that, when push comes to shove, the US is not meaningfully constrained by its institutional commitments. America's partners periodically chafe at this inequality and when they do much ink is spilt about the fate of the transatlantic alliance, but at day's end differences are patched up and the bargain is sustained, if for no other reason than a lack of feasible alternatives.
Official European perspectives meld-albeit with oft expressed reservations-with this overall approach. As Smith (2016) argues, the 'shared agenda' between the US and EU was made clearer in the more 'realist' European Union Global Strategy [EUGS] than it was before. The EUGS reaffirms Europe's commitment to the core principles that no great power prerogative can trump a democratic European state's right to join the Union if it wishes and qualifies, and that the 'transformation' of neighboring states by the power of example is not only a rule-based right but also a potent enhancement of EU member states' security. This approach has been by most accounts phenomenally successful, seeing the United States and its core allies through the Cold War, ushering in a post-Cold War era of unprecedented peace and prosperity, and facilitating the relentless expansion of the community of associated states. Yet it also comes with crucial downsides, the taproot of which is institutional rigidity. Scholarship from many social sciences leads to the expectation that institutions will be "sticky" and resistant to reform and adaptation.
Because institutions are hard to build anew, conservatism must be the watchword. The conditions under which the US and Europe forged their current set of grand strategic institutions were unique-World War II, the Cold War and the imperative of balancing Soviet power, the United States' unparalleled position of power within the west. Thus, once you take down an institution like NATO, it will be practically impossible to recreate it. The result is extreme risk aversion concerning any major revision to accommodate new circumstances.
These rigidities generate two kinds of strategic costs. First is the opportunity cost of exclusion. The basic principle is that the maintenance of US security commitments to partners and allies in Europe and Asia is a necessary condition of European security, and those commitments are exclusionary by definition to those who do not want accept U.S.
leadership. States against which those commitments are directed-especially China and Russia-can never be wholly integrated into the order. The result is to foreclose any alternative mode of great power concert. Securing the gains of institutionalized cooperation today may come at the price of having alienated potential partners tomorrow.
Second is the rigidity created by interdependence among all the parts of the western approach. The result is to create apparently potent disincentives to compromise.
Compromise on any given principle-say the principle that any neighboring democratic state that meets the relevant criteria may join the EU or NATO-may make sense when each of these cases is considered individually. But if compromise anywhere saps the order everywhere, any individual step toward ameliorating the concerns of outside major powers will be extremely hard to take. When western officials are confronted with arguments for compromises with Beijing or Moscow, these concerns frequently come to the fore. The west's international policies, with many layers of liberal discourse, institutionalism, and economic networks, reflect ideas and historical experiences unique to a few western countries, and especially the United States. The focus on using multilateral institutions to address problems that require inter-state cooperation resonates strongly with liberal theories as developed by scholars like John Ikenberry (2000) and Robert Keohane (2000; Keohane & Wallander 1999) . So, too, does the role of the United States as a liberal (open market) hegemon using its power advantage to overcome the barriers to collective action among self-interested states (Keohane 2012 ). More controversially, we contend that the approach is also strongly consistent with offensive realism. To be sure, offensive realism has no theoretical architecture to explain the role institutions play in the approach, but liberal thought cannot capture key features the way Mearsheimer's (2001) theory can. Focusing on the US as the leading state in the western system, two perennial features stand out.
First is the relentlessly preventive nature of the approach. What strikes the observer is how frequently force is applied now to stave off highly conjectural future threats. Historical research suggests that for the United States, costly uses of force associated with containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union were strongly preventive in nature from the very beginning of the Cold War, given that the Soviet threat they were intended to counter had yet to materialize concretely. From the initial containment policy to the massive military buildups of the 1950s and 1980s, to the globe-girdling interventionism in the third world, western power-seeking in the Cold War was always responding to threats that were imagined or expected to materialize well in the future, often a decade or more away (Leffler 1992; Wohlforth 1993; Zubok, 2007) .To forestall these future threats, U.S. governments undertook massive preventive investments in military power that always resulted in large power gaps in favor of the United States.
Most U.S. interventions in the Third World-uses of force associated with the deaths of over 2 million people-were also preventive in nature, driven by such doctrines as "falling dominos," that grossly exaggerated the adversary's power. (Westad 2005) . They were intended to forestall a "domino effect" of spreading Communist revolutions that would all miraculously succeed and yield regimes that would support Moscow geopolitically. To be sure, each intervention encompassed many aims, but security-driven preventive logic was generally a necessary condition of any large-scale action. The logic underlying these interventions was every bit as preventive as that underlying more recent interventions in the Balkans and Iraq.
Second is the relentless pursuit of primacy. U.S. conceptions of security during the Cold War demanded a decisive "preponderance of power" on all key indexes save the most expensive one: conventional military power in Europe. To compensate for the Soviets' logistical advantages in Eurasia, the United States assembled alliances in Western Europe, in the Middle East, and in South-East Asia, that outmatched Soviet/Warsaw Pact GDP by factors of four or more. Having assembled this overwhelming preponderance, the United States could not tolerate a Soviet rival that had any expectation of political or status equality. The period of early détente, when several American governments acknowledged strategic "parity" with the Soviet Union, was brief, limited to a few issue areas such as arms control, and ended with a resumed quest for US preponderance under Ronald Reagan.
The sudden advent of unipolarity in 1991, after the victory in the Gulf, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, altered the constraints and incentives on the United States but had little discernable effect on this core behavioral pattern. The United States expanded its influence into areas where Moscow recently had held sway, made its policy of primacy all but explicit, continued military investments that further entrenched its dominance, and sought to revise rules and institutions to reflect its newfound power.
Thus, the western approach blends elements that are consistent with all the theoretical schools. It is a way to tame inter-state anarchy in a manner favorable to the long term security of comparatively open, liberal polities. Liberal domestic institutions and the 'hands off'style of government they thrive on need a world in which security threats are kept far at bay. Let the wolf (or bear) come to close, and pressure will build for antiliberal "garrison state" policies that would spell the death knell for liberal governance (Friedberg 2000) . The result is a powerful drive for a 'maximalist' approach to security (Sestanovich 2014) . Though always coupled with the distinctive institution building aspect, this approach features in the leading state the expansionistic power seeking behavior predicted by offensive realism, which combines with liberal beliefs and a liberal-capitalist domestic system. The quest for primacy and the propensity to solve often-conjectural security threats via expansion are consistent with long-standing strains of realist thought, most recently exemplified by John Mearsheimer's reformulation of realist theory. The penchant to export risks and costs to others in favor of maintaining national prosperity reflects domestic constraints identified in liberal theories, but they often require American governments to trample on their own liberal norms and ideals.
The penchant to expand the ambit of liberal democratic governance is hard to suppress.
Efforts to make hegemony more efficient via international institutions are consistent with liberal and constructivist theories, but in any trade-off between the pursuit of primacy and fealty to rules of its own design, U.S. governments almost always opt for the former.
RUSSIA: SECURITY AND IDENTITY
Western analysts are struck by Russia's apparent obsession with geopolitics and great power prestige. Angela Merkel famously opined after a meeting with Vladimir Putin that the Russian president was 'in another world' (Traynor 2014) . Responding to Russia's annexation of Crimea, John Kerry protested that 'you just don't in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion' (Dunham 2014) . Western scholars argue that Russia's preoccupations with geopolitics and prestige are some kind of abnormality and are unrelated to the country's 'true' security needs. One problem with that argument is hypocrisy. Expansion and prestige-seeking under the guise of US leadership are intrinsic to the western approach to pursuing security, even though these are thickly shrouded in rhetoric, institutions, and rules. The second problem is that the more one knows about Russia's long career as a great power, including the period of the Soviet Union, the weaker that western argument becomes. For as Poe (2003) argues, Russia's great power career is a phenomenal success story. It is the only state outside Europe's western core to avoid subjugation by the powerful states and to stand as a great power for centuries. The only other state to compare is Japan, whose much shorter great power career ended disastrously with surrender and occupation. This basic story of success-albeit at fearsome cost to the Russians and other peoples ruled from St Petersburg and Moscowis central.
As one of us has argued elsewhere (Wohlforth 2001) , if you take the basic neorealist system of explanation developed by Waltz (1979) and apply it to Russia's circumstances, seeming "obsessions" with territorial expansion and great power status become all too easy to understand. Muscovy, the Russian empire, and the Soviet Union lived in tough geopolitical neighborhoods, with offense-dominant topography populated by more advanced expansionist states. Russian response to the threatening environments was to acquire and hold territory, by autocratic methods. The policy worked, while less autocratic states did not survive on the Eurasian plain. Indeed, Russia is by some measures the most successful imperial enterprise in history. It retained its peak territorial extent longer than any other empire, and for most of the last 400 years it has been the largest polity on earth (Taagepera 2007) . For Russia, territory did bring prestige and, and prestige was a necessary condition of security. If you were not recognized as a great power, you were not included in the political discourse that decided the fate of nations.
Without this status, you become an object not the subject of international politics.
Leading western historians of Russia have stressed the dependency of the Russian state on geopolitical factors. As Lieven (2000, ix) puts it: "The demands of international power politics and of membership of the European and then global system of great powers were of overwhelming importance in Russian history. More probably than any other single factor they determined the history of modern Russia." Rieber (2015, 3-4) , writes about "persistent factors" in the history of the Russian state: porous or permeable frontiers, particularly in the west and in the south; multinational borderlands; relative economic backwardness in comparison with powerful neighbors, and cultural alienation.
Geopolitical weakness, translated into the feeling of alienation and insecurity, Rieber sums up, "sets limitations on the range of policy choices... Different leaders will pursue different styles in conducting foreign policy, but they ignore only at their peril the restraints placed upon them by the persistent factors."
The collapse of the outer geopolitical ramparts in Eastern Europe and then the breakup of the Soviet Union itself left the core part of Russia, in the form of the Russian Federation. One consequence of Russia's past is that it remains the world's largest state, bordering more other countries (14) than another state save China. Another consequence is memories and the inertial identity of a superpower. Size, victory in World War II, special role in the United Nations, nuclear weapons, and superpower pedigree are the chief sources of Russia's claim to great power status today. And only on the geopolitical dimension and the past does Russia truly stand out. This may well help explain the appeal of geopolitical arguments that magnify the global significance of precisely this dimension. But Russia is hardly the first declining state to try to maximize the apparent value of things it still possesses in abundance. It took Great Britain half a century to adapt its foreign policy priorities to its declining power. It is not clear how long it would take Russia to do the same.
The popularity of geopolitics derives in part from plausible lessons that many Russians have drawn from their recent experience. Most of the new players in Moscow's foreign policy game-including Vladimir Putin-claim to have learned a lesson from the Soviet Union's experience that international politics is a highly competitive realm. They tend to be critical of Soviet policy in the Cold War for having overextended itself and ultimately weakened the country. However, they are united in the conviction that Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates bungled the management of Soviet decline by making far too many concessions -based on a mistaken faith in the positive-sum, cooperative nature of contemporary international politics. Their discourse resembles a laundry list of the "myths of empire" (Snyder 1991 ) excoriated by western scholars; belief in the prevalence of bandwagoning in world politics, the possibility of falling dominos, the vital importance of a reputation for power in order to maintain the country's status and security, and a strongly zero-sum conception of international security and economics. By explicitly rejecting those precepts, and implicitly buying in to frivolous western promises, Russian critics argue, Gorbachev allowed himself be taken for a geopolitical ride by less romantic and more savvy western policymakers (Zubok 2003 (Zubok , 2007 ).
More specifically, many Russian geopoliticans contend, the global importance of territory in general was demonstrated by the voluntary retraction of Soviet power from the river Elbe 1,500 kilometers east to the Soviet borders after 1989. From a relatively small economic base, the Soviet Union had formed one of two poles in a bipolar system.
Geography is an important port of the explanation for how Moscow managed to pull off this feat. If one measures international prestige by how much attention is paid to a given state, then the Soviet Union obtained immense prestige by virtue of its polar status. And that status was coterminous with the expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe after 1945, and its withdrawal after 1989. This shift in territorial sovereignty or suzerainty brought an end to the forty-year old structure of international politics and utterly transformed the strategic desiderata of every major power and many minor ones. If ever an event advertised the importance of control over territory to world politics it was the decline and fall of the Soviet Union. It is not surprising that people who had gone through this experience should conclude that ignoring the geopolitical factors courts peril.
As in the case of the west's approach, the Russian way of seeking security has major downsides. Above all, it means autocracy at home, which reached its odious peak under The main point here is that in both the western and Russian cases, approaches to security are deeply rooted and resonate with major strands of IR theory. They are thus hard to dismiss as passing obsessions sparked by this or that international interaction, personality, or domestic imperative.
FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES: SOVIET COLLAPSE AND POST-SOVIET EUROPE
To see how the western and Russian perspectives on security clash to produce an Washington effectively used its power advantage and alliance ties to put paid to schemes of integrating the USSR into the US-dominated European and trans-Atlantic institutions; even a hint of such intentions could question the priority accorded in US strategy to the states of Eastern Europe. Existing European security institutions, moreover, were seen as critical bulwarks of the western order-to put these in question in the search for more inclusive alternatives entailed risks few policymakers were willing to take. American strategic priorities hardly changed subsequently. Despite the declared 'Russia first' course of the Clinton presidency, the bottom line was that Russia should take a place in the US-led international order as a weak regional power with limited military capacities.
The United States' initial recognition of Russia as a leading power in the post-Soviet space soured as a fateful security dilemma began to emerge between Russia and neighbouring newly independent states. Those states, notably Georgia and Ukraine.
appealed to the United States and other western governments protect them from Russia's ambitions to restore its regional primacy. After 1994, the United States shifted the bulk of its assistance to Russia's neighbors. Geopolitical priorities became reaffirmed after the Clinton Administration invited Poland, the Czech republic, and Hungary to join NATO.
Even if this happened 'in a fit of absence of mind', as some contend, it does not change longer-term consequences. (Goldgeier, 1999; Goldgeier and MacFaul, 2003) . Western politicians assumed that Russia would ultimately accommodate the new realities, and that even if Moscow remained recalcitrant it had no capacity to stop the process. Russia received a consolation prize in the form of its membership of G-7, the prestigious club of world powers, and in the NATO-Russia Council, a unique institution designed to keep Russia attached to the alliance without any real voice in it.
On the Soviet-Russian side, serious attempts at partnership foundered on a lack of the necessary power to compel or entice the west to compromise its core approach.
During the last years of the Soviet Union, the Gorbachev leadership attempted to transform the USSR's superpower status into the role of an essential partner of the United
States. The integrationist rhetoric of 'new thinking' and 'common European home' notwithstanding, the Kremlin never gave up geopolitical interests. Gorbachev expected the United States and the integrated Europe to build a global order in a partnership with the reformed Soviet Union, rather than pursue a unilateralist strategy and deal with a handful of smaller, struggling states in the post-Soviet space. There was also an expectation that Soviet-German cooperation would help balance US power in Europe. (Chernyaev, 1997) . Even before Soviet weakness and collapse buried these schemes, their unrealistic nature became obvious. Germany became a key American ally in NATO and in the emerging EU. Both structures were specifically constructed not to include the Soviet Union and then Russia.
Boris Yeltsin and his foreign policy advisers believed that the Soviet Union was not
viable, yet they expected Russia to regain its world status and primacy vis-à-vis its neighbors, despite its temporary weakness. Meanwhile, the collapse of Russia's economic and military power, the most catastrophic since 1917-21, dictated pragmatic policies. 'Persistent factors' of porous borders and troubled multinational borderlands (above all in the Caucasus) quickly reminded the Kremlin of their existence. In these dire conditions, Russia accepted US leadership in global affairs, but this was provisional and conditional., In return for its cooperation, the Russian leadership expected American financial assistance, recognition of its status as a global power, and acceptance of Russia's leadership in the post-Soviet space. Never-even during its most liberal and westernizing moments-did the Yeltsin government abandon the core precept that immediate neighbors other than the Baltic states could not be geopolitically alienated from Moscow and become members of alliances of which Russia was not a member.
As in the case of the Soviet Union's last-minute aspirations, Russian expectations of the 1990s were bound to be frustrated. Large-scale American financial assistance did not In light of Russia's deep-set approach to grand strategy, the changing international situation in Eastern Europe presented Moscow with a familiar choice: to join the predominant constellation as a junior partner of the United States as well as European Union or to try to assert itself again as a major player. The issue of identity added to this equation. In the 1990s Russia attempted to position itself as a democratic state opposite in identity to its predecessor; fifteen years after 1991 the benefits of this thesis diminished significantly, and traditional geopolitical identity was reasserted by the claims that Russia defeated itself or was 'deceived' by western powers in the end of the Cold War (Zubok, 2015) .
In 2008 
CONCLUSION: NEW PRESSURE FOR CHANGE?
The upshot of this analysis is that the path to a pragmatic, stable partnership with Russia's security interests and the prospects of autocracy or democracy in Moscow. And they greatly underestimate Russia's predicament as a big country in a crowded and insecure geopolitical environment, the country that lacks the power to organize its space and defend its interests within existing international structures and alliances.
To say that analysts commonly underestimate the seriousness and staying power of the west's and Russia's conflicting approaches to security is not to say that nothing can change them. We know that since 1990 incentives to revise these approaches in the interest of alleviating rivalry between Russia and the west have not been sufficiently strong. What we cannot now know is whether changes are afoot that might alter these incentives.
Until the fall of 2016, the dominant bet in Washington and key European capitals was that sanctions, international isolation, and long term decline would compel Russia to back down on its claim to a sphere of influence in its near abroad and accept a bargain on
Ukraine that would not compromise the west's core approach. We cannot predict the precise trajectory of Russia's power. Precipitous decline might compel retreat, and there is little doubt that Putinist Russia has failed to create the truly innovative and competitive political economy a 21 st century great power needs. But our analysis casts doubt on the prospects that 'strategic patience' will deliver a dramatically more accommodating Russia. Barring a much speedier and steeper decline than most experts now forecast, Russia is more likely to react according to the logic of neorealism: seeking to maximize its security by building new partnerships, concentrating its resources even more in the hands of the state, and acting as a spoiler behind its nuclear 'shield,' using numerous means at its disposal to try to compel United States and its allies to negotiate terms that acknowledge Moscow's great power perquisites. Graham and Rojansky (2016) Long term trends therefore do arguably undermine both sides' long-held strategic approaches. Russia is not strong enough to compete with the west on the west's terms but not weak enough to foreswear its identity and security interests. The west's approach has clearly lost momentum-the heady idea of endless liberal expansion is weaker than at any time since the publication of Fukuyama's 'End of History' article-but it is still backstopped by gigantic material and soft-power advantages over Russia. As Smith (2016) argues, strategy is about relating ends and means. The EU's inability to do this helped contribute to the current impasse. While our analysis does lean toward an expectation of continued deadlock, nothing in it rules out a new appreciation in both
Russia and the west of the need to trim expectations of what ends they can pursue closer to long term power realities.
